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SMART BABY MONITORS: THE MODERN 
NANNY OR A HOME INVADER 
Sarah Ensenat + 
Washington state parents Sarah and Jay used a smart baby monitor to ensure 
the safety of their child.1 The couple became concerned when their three-year-
old son told them he was talking to a man in his room at night.2 One night Sarah 
and Jay waited in their son’s room and heard a voice over the smart baby monitor 
say, “Wake up little boy. Daddy’s looking for you.”3 The couple also observed 
the camera of the smart baby monitor following them when they were in the 
room with their son.4 Stories like Sarah and Jay’s are unfortunately common.5 
Recently in the news, smart baby monitors reportedly have been hacked in Indi-
ana, Texas, and Minnesota.6 
Smart baby monitors exist to help parents protect and watch over their chil-
dren.7 Parents buy smart baby monitors so they can watch and listen to see if 
                                                 
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2018, The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law; 
B.A. 2014, Franklin and Marshall College. The Author would like to thank Professor Lisa 
Martin for her assistance and support in the research and writing of this comment. The Au-
thor would also like to thank the hard work and dedication of the associates and editors of 
the Journal of Law and Technology for their hard work on the preparation of this comment. 
 1 Brendan Kelly, Parents Warn Others After Baby Monitor Gets Hacked, AMERI-
CANOW (June 5, 2017), http://www.americanow.com/story/society/2017/03/16/parents-
warn-others-after-baby-monitor-gets-hacked. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id.; see also Rochester Family Finds Their “Nanny Cam” Hacked For The World to 
See, KTTC (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.kttc.com/story/28712087/2015/04/03/rochester-
family-finds-their-nanny-cam-hacked-for-the-world-to-see (recounting a nation-wide in-
crease in the hacking of smart baby monitors). 
 6 Kelly, supra note 1; see also Rochester Family Finds Their “Nanny Cam” Hacked 
For The World to See, supra note 5. 
 7 See Jenna Flannigan, Parental Warning: Your Baby Monitor Can Be Hacked, HUFF-
INGTON POST: THE BLOG, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/healthline-/parental-warning-your-
bab_b_11668882.html (last updated Aug. 24, 2017); see also Winston Ross, How to Protect 
Yourself From the World’s Perviest Hackers, THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 15, 2013, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/15/how-to-protect-yourself-from-the-world-
s-perviest-hackers.html (describing how parents can protect their smart baby monitors from 
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their infant or child is in need of help.8 Low-tech hackers are able to compromise 
smart baby monitors and use the footage of infants and children for nefarious 
purposes.9 Hackers upload the videos of children to illegal websites or keep the 
videos for their personal use.10 Additionally, burglars can use the footage from 
smart baby monitors to break into homes.11 
Older baby monitors, or analogue baby monitors, worked over radio waves 
and were easily hacked.12 People would listen to private conversations or say 
threatening and lewd things to children.13 As technology advanced, companies 
manufactured smart baby monitors that worked over the Internet and connected 
to a home’s personal router.14 Unfortunately, most homeowners’ personal routers 
are not secured, leaving some smart baby monitors accessible to anyone who 
can find the camera’s Internet address.15 Security of smart baby monitors has 
always been an issue that has not been properly addressed by federal and state 
legislatures.16 Regulations such as the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA) are in place to force technology companies targeting children to pri-
oritize the privacy of the children’s personal information.17 These regulations do 
not adequately address security for personal smart products such as smart baby 
                                                 
hackers). 
 8 Flannigan, supra note 7; see also Ross, supra note 7 (describing how parents can pro-
tect their smart baby monitors from hackers). 
 9 Flannigan, supra note 7; see also Ross, supra note 7 (describing how parents can pro-
tect their smart baby monitors from hackers). 
 10 See Flannigan, supra note 7 (discussing the ease in which smart baby monitors can be 
hacked and identifying who are the likely hackers of the monitors). 
 11 See generally Nikole Davenport, Smart Washers May Clean Your Clothes, But Hacks 
Can Clean Out Your Privacy, And Underdeveloped Regulations Could Leave You Hanging 
on A Line, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 259, 274-93 (2016) (discussing that 
smart devices, including smart baby monitors, can be easily hacked without proper regula-
tions). 
 12 Ross, supra note 7. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Anthony Cuthbertson, How To Protect Baby Monitors From Hackers, NEWSWEEK: 
TECH & SCI. (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/how-protect-baby-monitors-hack-
ers-421104. 
 15 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Marketer of Internet-Connected Home Security 
Video Cameras Settles FTC Charges It Failed to Protect Consumers’ Privacy (Sept. 4, 
2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/marketer-internet-con-
nected-home-security-video-cameras-settles [hereinafter Press Release, Federal Trade 
Comm’n Sept. 4, 2013] (explaining the need to secure personal routers to limit public access 
to wireless devices like smart baby monitors). 
 16 Eli Dourado & Andrea Castillo, Poor Federal Cybersecurity Reveals Weakness of 
Technocratic Approach, 2–3, 5, (MERCATUS CTR. AT GEO. MASON UNIV., June 2015), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Dourado-Poor-Federal-Cybersecurity-MOP.pdf. 
 17 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §6502 (2015) (stat-
ing the purpose of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act). 
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monitors.18 COPPA focuses on advertising companies and websites collecting 
personal information on children and not personal-sized smart objects.19 
This Comment advocates for stricter federal security legislation for smart 
baby monitors that requires: 1) stricter login credentials for the smart baby mon-
itor’s network, 2) a department to monitor the security of a product and the po-
tential breaches of privacy, 3) training and continuing education for individuals 
monitoring the security of products, and 4) the notification of consumers if their 
privacy has been breached and the provision of free services to remedy the 
breach.20 Section I of this Comment introduced the lack of security surrounding 
smart baby monitors. Section II of this Comment provides a background in the 
rise of Internet hacking and discusses the history of legislation for personal smart 
technology products like smart baby monitors. Section II also illustrates a failed 
attempt to create stricter security legislation and new legislation in New Jersey. 
Section III of this Comment addresses existing regulations the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) has put in place to promote better security measures for 
smart baby monitors. This Section then discusses where smart baby monitor se-
curity stands today, and addresses the attempt to enforce regulations through a 
previous FTC suit against a smart baby monitor manufacturer. Section IV of this 
Comment explores a current case filed by the FTC against a smart baby monitor 
technology company. This case could change the way smart baby monitor man-
ufacturers and Congress address legislation regulating the security of smart de-
vices. Section V of this Comment continues to evaluate how the FTC has applied 
existing federal legislation and regulations to smart baby monitor manufacturers. 
Section VI of this Comment proposes and analyzes suggestions for federal leg-
islation to protect consumers from smart baby monitors. Finally, Section VII of 
this Comment concludes with a recommendation to Congress to revise COPPA 
or create new smart baby monitor focused legislation. New legislation focused 
on improving the security of smart baby monitors must be promulgated to ensure 
the protection of consumer privacy. Without new legislation, Congress and the 
FTC cannot ensure that all smart baby monitor manufacturers are applying the 
best security measures to their smart devices and providing the best support for 
consumers when hackers invade their privacy. 
                                                 
 18 See generally Davenport, supra note 11 at 261 (explaining that “there is more work 
needed to minimize these risks that come along with the convenience of using IoT de-
vices.”). 
 19 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2015). 
 20 See generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public 
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. 55,717 (Sept. 11, 2013) (analyzing the proposed consent order be-
tween the FTC and TRENDnet). 
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THE RISE OF INTERNET HACKING AND THE HISTORY OF IOT LEGIS-
LATION 
Hacking low-security technology can be easily learned.21  Widely available 
books and classes have made it easier for one to take a course or check out a 
book at a local library.22 Anyone with vocational training or self-taught training 
in computer programming can learn to hack Internet devices.23 Personal smart 
technology items such as phones, smart-watches, and baby monitors are difficult 
to protect with strong security measures.24 The danger of personal smart devices 
is the insecurity of the Internet of Things (IoT), which connects smart devices.25 
The IoT comprises “everyday devices that are connected to the Internet” that can 
be “remotely controlled or sensed.”26 The IoT is connected to everything used in 
daily life and viewed as connected to products essential to every man, woman, 
and child.27 These everyday devices include smart baby monitors.28 
A. History of IoT Security Measures  
                                                 
 21 See generally wikiHow to Become a Hacker, WIKIHOW, https://www.wiki-
how.com/Become-a-Hacker (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (describing the low barriers to ob-
taining the ability to hack low-security technology). 
 22 See Brandon Stosh, 5 Free Websites to Learn Hacking!, FREEDOMHACKER (Dec. 23, 
2015), https://freedomhacker.net/top-free-websites-to-learn-hacking-2016-4842/; see gener-
ally Computer Programming, DC LIBRARY CATALOG, https://catalog.dclibrary.org (last vis-
ited Dec. 19, 2017) (conducting a search of the DC Library catalog provides access to sev-
eral books that are available to teach individuals Internet coding and hacking). 
 23 See generally wikiHow to Become a Hacker, supra note 21. 
 24 Amelia R. Montgomery, Just What the Doctor Ordered: Protecting Privacy Without 
Impeding Development of Digital Pills, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 147, 169 (2016) (illus-
trating the vulnerability of personal smart electronic devices). 
 25 Laura Jehl, Jonathan Meyer & Sonja Carlson, Attack of The Zombie Webcams: DDoS 
Attacks And The Insecure IoT, LAW 360 (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.law360.com/arti-
cles/861699/attack-of-the-zombie-webcams-ddos-attacks-and-the-insecure-iot; see Rachel 
Metz, Finding Insecurity in the Internet of Things, 119 MIT TECH. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2016, at 
76 (acknowledging that “by 2020, almost 21 billion gadgets will be connected to the Inter-
net” and in effect, such connectivity increases the “potential ways for cyberattackers to 
wreak havoc.”). 
 26 Jehl et al., supra note 25 (recognizing that many consumers do not realize IoT de-
vices sold by manufacturers come with default usernames and passwords capable of being 
reset and warning consumers to be aware of similar devices that do not permit such change). 
 27 See generally Cate Lawrence, IoT Security Concerns Show an Industry Struggling to 
Keep Up, READWRITE (Feb. 5, 2016), https://readwrite.com/2016/02/05/iot-security/ (stating 
the numerous smart products that are used by both adults and children are vulnerable); see 
also Jehl et al., supra note 25 (illustrating that connected devices includes both obvious con-
nected devices and non-obvious devices including “toasters and lightbulbs”). 
 28 Jehl et al., supra note 25. 
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The IoT does not have a strong history of security legislation or regulation.29 
Hackers have the ability and incentive to take over these smart devices, includ-
ing smart baby monitors.30 Whether their purpose is to create a digital army31 or 
steal the personal information including video footage of consumers, hackers 
can hijack a baby monitor without the parents even knowing.32 The IoT device 
security is “ripe for government regulation,” but manufacturers do not have 
strong incentives to secure their devices until customers demand it.33 As long as 
consumers continue to buy their products, manufacturers do not feel a need to 
increase security.34 
B. History of Federal Legislation 
There are currently some existing federal security laws and regulations to en-
force cybersecurity, but they do not address smart baby monitors.35 They address 
Internet use and company storage of children’s personal and private infor-
mation.36  The laws and regulations especially focus on advertisers targeting chil-
dren and their collection of the children’s private information.37 
In 1998 Congress passed COPPA to protect the personal information of chil-
dren and minors.38 The purpose of COPPA is to regulate “unfair and deceptive 
acts and practices in connection with collection and use of personal information 
from and about children on the internet.”39 As technology evolved, the Federal 
Trade Commission attempted to strengthen COPPA by passing an amendment 
                                                 
 29 Id.; Randy Milch, A First Legislative Step in the IoT Security Battle, LAWFARE (Aug. 
4, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/first-legislative-step-iot-security-battle. 
 30 Jehl et al., supra note 25. 
 31 A “digital army” consists of two or more hackers that take control of millions of IoT 
devices to launch an attack on major service providers. Unsecured devices such as smart 
baby monitors can be used to infect other devices in the vicinity and easily hijack connected 
devices. See id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See FTC Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13 
(2013) (describing regulations implementing the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act); 
see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2012). 
 36 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13; see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06. 
 37 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06; see also 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13. 
 38 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06; see also 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13. 
 39 See 15 U.S.C. §6502. 
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to COPPA on July 1, 2013.40 Children’s personal information was further pro-
tected by clarifying the definitions of “operator,”41 “website or online service 
directed to children,”42 and “support for internal operations.”43 The new COPPA 
requirements also changed requirements for obtaining informed consent of par-
ents,44 strengthened safe harbor programs,45 and created strong provisions to keep 
kids information confidential and secure.46 Requirements were not set for man-
ufacturers of smart baby monitors and other smart products that work over the 
Internet; requirements were only set for web operators and the third parties to 
which they sell the children’s personal information.47 
C. Failed Federal Amendment 
The federal government has tried to pass legislation to improve the regulation 
of baby monitors.48 In March of 2012, the House rejected Crowley Amendment 
                                                 
 40 Amended COPPA Rule Comes into Effect, HUNTON & WILLIAMS PRIVACY & INFO. 
SEC. L. BLOG (July 1, 2013), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2013/07/01/amended-
coppa-rule-comes-into-effect/; see also Lesley Fair, FTC’s Revised COPPA Rule: Five 
Need-To-Know Changes for Your Business, FTC: BUS. BLOG (Dec. 19, 2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2012/12/ftcs-revised-coppa-rule-five-
need-know-changes-your-business (describing the revised COPPA rule). 
 41 Operator is defined as “an operator of a child-directed site or service where it allows 
outside services, like plug-ins or advertising networks, to collect personal information from 
visitors.” Fair, supra note 40; see also Amended COPPA Rule Comes into Effect, supra note 
40. 
 42 Website or online service directed to children is defined as “a plug-in or ad network 
when it has actual knowledge that it’s collecting personal information through a child-di-
rected website or service...requiring them to provide notice and get parental consent only for 
those who identify themselves as under 13.” Fair, supra note 40. 
 43 Support for internal operations “include[s]...contextual advertising, frequency cap-
ping, legal compliance, site analysis, and network communications. Operators may not, 
without parental consent, use or disclose information collected to contact a specific person, 
including through behavioral advertising, to amass a profile on that person or for any other 
purpose.” Id. 
 44 “Operators must send [notice] directly to parents before collecting personal info from 
their kids.” The notice must be “to-the-point” and include “what operators have to put in 
their online privacy policies about their information practices.” Id. 
 45 Safe harbor programs provide incentives for companies to self-regulate and ensure 
they are in compliance with COPPA. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2012). 
 46 COPPA created strict provisions, which companies must follow, and they will im-
prove the confidentiality and security of children’s information.  Under these provisions, 
“[o]perators are required to take reasonable steps to ensure that children’s personal infor-
mation is disclosed only to service providers and third parties capable of maintaining the 
confidentiality, security, and integrity of such information.” Amended COPPA Rule Comes 
into Effect, supra note 40. 
 47 Fair, supra note 40. 
 48 See S. Res. 110, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted) (providing that the Senate recom-
mends the United States develop a strategy for the Internet of Things to promote economic 
2018] Smart Baby Monitors 7 
No. 1, which would have affected any regulation relating to baby monitors prom-
ulgated by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).49 The purpose of 
the FCC is to control “communication laws, regulations, and technological in-
novation.”50 The Crowley amendment would have required baby monitors to 
display a warning label to inform consumers that the video and sound captured 
by baby monitors and smart baby monitors could be easily viewed or heard by 
someone outside of the home.51  
The FCC is not the only government agency that has attempted to compel 
Congress to reform security requirements. After the Amendment failed, the 
FTC52 released a report detailing a privacy framework intended to “articulate 
best practices for companies that collect and use consumer data.”53 The attempts 
have been unsuccessful because of limited public interest and lackluster Con-
gressional oversight.54  Unless constituents alert Congress to the security prob-
lems and media outlets draw Congress’ attention, congressional oversight is a 
common problem.55 
D. Enacted State Legislation 
Not only has the majority of the proposed legislation not been passed, the 
proposed legislation does not sufficiently restrict bad behavior or promote the 
                                                 
growth and consumer empowerment); 158 CONG. REC. 50, H1624 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) 
(proposed Floor Amend. 1 to H.R. 3309, 112th Cong.); see generally H. Amend. 1 to Fed-
eral Communications Commission Process Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 3309, 112th Cong. 
(proposed to House, Mar. 27, 2012) (recommending that “the packaging of an analog baby 
monitor to display a warning label” so that families are informed that video and sounds 
“may be easily viewed or heard by potential intruders.”). 
 49 158 CONG. REC. 50, H1624 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) (proposed Floor Amend. 1 to 
H.R. 3309, 112th Cong). 
 50 About the FCC, FCC.GOV, http://www.fcc.gov/about/overview (last visited Dec. 19, 
2017) (explaining that the FCC is an independent agency overseen by Congress that “regu-
lates interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and ca-
ble in all 50 states. . .”). 
 51 Federal Communications Commission Process Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 3309, 112th 
Cong. (2012). 
 52 About the FTC, FTC.GOV, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) 
(explaining that the FTC is an independent agency overseen by Congress whose purpose is 
to prevent “anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices…”). 
 53 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS, at iii (2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-
protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See generally Jared Bomberg, FTC litigation prompts changes to congressional over-
sight, IAPP (Oct. 27, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/ftc-litigation-prompts-changes-to-con-
gressional-oversight/ (stating that new litigation prompted congress to take a closer look at 
regulations and common practices). 
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security of IoT devices.56 Much of the legislation proposes a warning label on all 
smart baby monitors that warns parents of their potential to be hacked.57 Any-
thing more restrictive has experienced difficulty being passed or has not been 
drafted at all.58 While the federal government has been unsuccessful in passing 
legislation to secure smart baby monitors, states have begun to fill the gaps.59 
New Jersey passed legislation that requires greater security measures for 
smart baby monitors.60 Once the Assembly passed the legislation, the Senate re-
viewed it.61 After amendments by the Senate were included, the Senate passed 
the legislation and sent it to the Assembly for a “second reading on concur-
rence.”62 The Assembly again passed the legislation and Governor Chris Christie 
signed the bill.63 The passing of this legislation could provide a great start to 
holding manufacturers of smart baby monitors accountable for their security 
breaches of consumer privacy.64 
The language of the original proposed bill required: 
[b]aby monitor[s] that broadcasts audio or video through an internet connection 
shall be sold or offered for sale in the States unless it includes: (1) security features 
to prevent unauthorized users from hearing or viewing activity; and (2) a label or 
notice warning consumers of the risks associated with an unsecured baby monitor 
connection, and the importance of accessing the baby monitor securely and using 
its security features.65 
The smart baby monitors sold in New Jersey must contain a clearly worded 
                                                 
 56 Dourado & Castillo, supra note 16. 
 57 See S. Res. 110, 114th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Mar. 24, 2015) (“[E]xpressing the 
sense of the Senate about a strategy for the Internet of Things to promote economic growth 
and consumer empowerment”); see generally Federal Communications Commission Process 
Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 3309, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 58 Korey Clark, States Address Cybersecurity, Election Reform And Other Issues, LEX-
ISNEXIS: STATENET CAPITOL J., https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/state-net/b/capi-
tol-journal/archive/2017/07/07/states-address-cybersecurity-election-reform-and-other-is-
sues.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
 59 Id. 
 60 See generally N.J. Assemb. B. 3581, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2017) (requiring 
“internet-connected baby monitors to include security features” and a warning label). 
 61 N.J. Assemb., Legis. History of N.J. Assemb. B. 3581, 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/default.asp (type 3581 into bill number search engine; follow 
A3581 link) (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Lilo H. Stainton, Getting The Word Out on NJ’s Big ‘Baby Box’ Giveaway, NJ SPOT-
LIGHT (Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/17/03/16/getting-the-word-out-
on-nj-s-big-baby-box-giveaway/. 
 65 See N.J. Assemb. B. 3581, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2017) (describing the security 
requirements for baby monitors). 
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warning66 about potential security risks and technical features designed to thwart 
such infiltration.67  The legislation continues to describe the security require-
ments for the smart baby monitor.68 The bill’s final language, now law, says that 
smart baby monitor manufacturers are required to follow five security measures 
that state manufactures must: 
(1) provide end-to-end encryption; (2) provide Certificate-based Authentication for 
manufacturer access when obtaining updates, registering, or relaying audio or video 
between Internet servers; (3) prohibit unauthorized access, including prohibiting 
implied third-party trusted access; (4) prevent a consumer from disabling security 
measures; and (5) include conspicuous and easily understandable instructions sup-
plied by the manufacturer notifying consumers about the proper use of the baby 
monitor and its security enhancement.69 
New Jersey could inspire other states to adopt legislation securing smart baby 
monitors that would hopefully draw Congress’ attention in the near future.70 
Congressional enforcement of stricter security legislation is the consumers’ best 
hope in ensuring the privacy of their family and children.71 
FEDERAL REGULATION 
To enforce federal law, federal agencies work to ensure smart baby monitor 
manufacturers are able to understand enacted legislation.72 Additionally, agen-
cies promulgate regulations to fill gaps in the law to make it more efficient and 
effective.73 If manufacturers do not comply with regulations, then agencies bring 
actions to enforce compliance.74 
A. History of Federal Regulation 
                                                 
 66 See id. 
 67 Stainton, supra note 64. 
 68 See N.J. Assemb. B. 3581, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2017). 
 69 See id. (quoting the bill’s five required security measures). 
 70 Alfred Ng, Congress to smart device makers: Your security sucks, CNET (Aug. 2, 
2017), https://www.cnet.com/news/congress-senate-iot-device-makers-your-security-sucks/. 
 71 Id. 
 72 About the FTC, supra note 52. 
 73 Id.; see FTC Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13 
(2013). 
 74 Jose Pagliery, FTC sues maker of routers, baby monitors over security, CNNMONEY 
(Jan. 5, 2017, 7:42 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/05/technology/ftc-d-link-lawsuit; 
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges Against 
TRENDnet, Inc. (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/2014/02/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-against-trendnet-inc [hereinafter 
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014]; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 
4, 2013, supra note 15. 
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In response to Congress passing COPPA, the FTC promulgated regulations to 
inform the public how they would apply COPPA.75 The FTC is an agency that 
was created in 1914 by Congress to “prevent unfair methods of competition in 
commerce.”76 Congress has given “the agency greater authority to police anti-
competitive practices over the years.”77 In 1938, Congress directed the FTC to 
apply several consumer protection laws “including the Telemarketing Sales 
Rule, the Pay-Per-Call Rule, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.”78 Then in 
1975, Congress authorized the FTC to regulate trade rules of industry.79 
Now, the FTC’s purpose is to prevent “anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair 
business practices…”80 The FTC protects consumers by filing suits against busi-
nesses and corporations not following safety and security requirements.81 In 
1975, Congress granted the FTC authority to regulate the technology field.82 
COPPA falls primarily under the FTC’s jurisdiction, allowing the agency to cre-
ate regulations as standard practices for technology companies that are inter-
twined with children’s products.83 The FTC regulations §§ 312.1-312.12 de-
scribe how the FTC applies COPPA to the industry.84 Specifically, the regula-
tions require technology companies that provide services over the internet to 
notify parents of any data retention of their children’s personal information, to 
obtain parental consent for any retained personal data, and to prevent the storage 
and collection of children’s personal information over the Internet.85 
COPPA and the FTC regulations only focus on operators’ data collection and 
storage.86 Consequently, they do not identify security measures smart baby man-
ufacturers must take to prevent hackers from collecting and storing children’s 
personal information.87 The FTC has issued press releases and policy reports en-
couraging stricter asking Congress to approve legislation and create regulations 
for security and privacy of smaller technology products such as smart phones, 
                                                 
 75 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13 (2013). 
 76 About the FTC, supra note 52. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 What We Do, FTC.GOV, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last visited Dec. 
19, 2017). 
 82 About the FTC, supra note 52. 
 83 Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FTC.GOV, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-
asked-questions (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
 84 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.12 (2013). 
 85 See id. 
 86 See 15 U.S.C § 6502 (2012); 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.12. 
 87 See 15 U.S.C §§ 6501-05; see generally 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.13. 
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smart watches, and baby monitors.88 The FTC has been unable to sway Congress 
thus far.89 Without legislation for these new smart products, they are vulnerable 
to potential hackers.90 As a result of Congress’ lack of response, the FTC at-
tempts to implement their recommendations by charging manufacturers of smart 
baby monitors with deceptive and unfair practices.91 
B. Gaps in Regulation 
In February 2016, President Obama issued Executive Order 13718 to create 
the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity (CENCS) in an attempt 
to improve national security and develop new technical solutions.92 The purpose 
of the CENCS is to: 
make detailed recommendations to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and 
private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and 
national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, 
and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the 
private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technolo-
gies, policies, and best practices.93 
The CENCS’ December 2016 report included six main imperatives and various 
recommendations and actions that should be taken to better reinforce cyberse-
curity.94 While their recommendations and actions are commendable and can be 
applied to smart baby monitors, they only provide advice on what should be 
                                                 
 88 Pagliery, supra note 74; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 
74; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 4, 2013, supra note 15. 
 89 See Bomberg, supra note 55 (stating that new litigation prompted congress to take a 
closer look at regulations and common practices). 
 90 See id.; Daniel Cooper, Senators push legislation to protect election systems from 
hacks, ENGADGET (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/10/31/senate-save-act/ 
(commenting on the Securing America’s Voting Equipment Act as a legislative initiative to 
prevent domestic and foreign interference with election systems via hacking and uphold De-
partment of Homeland Security’s designation of election systems as “crucial infrastruc-
ture”). 
 91 See generally Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 2, 
FTC v. D-Link Corp., No. 3:17 Civ. 39 (N.D. Cal. 2017), 2017 WL 65168 (asserting the al-
leged violations of D-Link Corp. and their alleged deceptive act or practice). 
 92 Exec. Order No. 13718, 81 Fed. Reg. 29, 7441 (Feb. 9, 2016) (creating the Commis-
sion on Enhancing National Cybersecurity). 
 93 Id. 
 94 COMM’N ON ENHANCING NAT’L CYBER SEC., REPORT ON SECURING AND GROWING 
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., 53-59 (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/02/cybersecurity-commission-
report-final-post.pdf. 
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done.95 The CENCS does not have the power to enforce any of its recommenda-
tions or take the actions it requests.96 Instead, that power lies only with the leader 
of the executive branch, or the President.97 
Per the December 2016 report issued, any recommendations that are to be 
implemented will occur during the Trump administration.98 President Trump was 
scheduled to sign an executive order on cybersecurity on January 31, 2017, but 
abruptly failed to sign at the last minute.99 In turn, President Trump announced 
that “the U.S. will take quick action to secure critical infrastructure and networks 
and modernize IT systems.”100 
In addition to national security, President Trump wants to focus on improving 
the private sector.101  When President Trump held off signing the executive order 
on cybersecurity, he stated that the federal government “must work with the pri-
vate sector . . . to make sure that owners and operators . . . have the support they 
need from the federal government to defend against cyber threats.”102 In early 
May 2017, President Trump signed a new executive order on cybersecurity.103 
President Trump’s executive order provides that federal “agencies should be 
held accountable for their own cybersecurity and requires . . . that they introduce 
the cybersecurity framework developed by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST).”104 Only time will tell if the new executive order is ef-
fective. 
C. FTC Suit to Enforce Regulations 
Previously, the FTC filed suit against a smart baby monitor manufacturer for 
its failure to adhere to the regulations promulgated by the agency to ensure 
proper implementation of COPPA.105 In the settlement of the suit, the FTC issued 
                                                 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Cyber security executive order signing canceled, CBS NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017, 3:56 
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-cybersecurity-executive-order/. 
 100 Sean D. Carberry, Trump postpones cyber executive order, FCW (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://fcw.com/articles/2017/01/31/trump-cyber-eo-delay-carberry.aspx. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Morgan Chalfant, Congress offers some early praise of Trump’s executive order, THE 
HILL (May 11, 2017, 5:34 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/333039-congress-of-
fers-some-early-praise-of-trumps-cyber-executive-order. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb 7, 2014, supra note 74; Press Release, Fed-
eral Trade Comm’n Sept. 4, 2013, supra note 15. 
2018] Smart Baby Monitors 13 
additional recommendations to remedy these issues industry-wide.106 In 2013, 
the FTC brought suit against TRENDnet, Inc., a producer of IP cameras used in 
smart baby monitors.107 An IP Camera is a camera used for video surveillance 
through a network connection. 108  Most IP Cameras can be adjusted and viewed 
from any web browser through Internet access if the IP Camera’s network is 
known.109 Before the suit went to court, TRENDnet settled with the FTC and a 
Consent Order110 was issued.111 
The FTC alleged that TRENDnet had (1) publicly transmitted consumer login 
credentials over the Internet; (2) stored consumers’ login credentials on personal 
smart devices that was easily readable; (3) failed to monitor and correct vulner-
abilities and security breaches; and (4) failed to provide reasonable security in 
the design and testing of the software in the IP cameras.112 By failing to abide by 
the FTC promulgated regulations, the company subjected their consumers to a 
                                                 
 106 See TRENDnet, Inc., Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 
78 Fed. Reg. 55,717, 55,718 (Sept. 11, 2013) (describing the proposed consent order be-
tween the Federal Trade Commission and TRENDnet); Press Release Feb. 7, 2014, supra 
note 74; see also S. Res. 110, 114th Cong. (2015) (“Expressing the sense of the Senate 
about a strategy for the Internet of Things to promote economic growth and consumer em-
powerment”); Comm’n on Enhancing Nat’l Sec., Exec. Order No. 13718, 81 Fed. Reg. 7441 
(Feb. 9, 2016). See generally Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps 
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 135 
(2014) (discussing the security vulnerabilities around every day small electronics such as 
Fitbit trackers, insulin pumps, and baby monitors being hacked and the need to ensure that 
they are secure when being purchased). 
 107 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally 
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 176 at 55,717-18. 
 108 See Encyclopedia, Definition of: IP Camera, PC MAG. (last visited Dec. 19, 2017), 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/60055/IP-camera (directing the reader to see the 
definition of “Network Camera.”); Encyclopedia, Definition of: Network Camera, PC MAG. 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2017), http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/60055/network-cam-
era. 
 109 See Encyclopedia, Definition of: IP Camera, supra note 108; Encyclopedia, Defini-
tion of: Network Camera, supra note 108. 
 110 A Consent Order is “a voluntary agreement worked out between two or more parties 
to a dispute...[and] has the same effect as a court order and can be enforced by the court if 
anyone does not comply with the orders.” Consent Order Law and Legal Definition, US LE-
GAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/consent-order/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). Adminis-
trative agencies, such as the FTC, may issue Consent Orders in which a manufacturer agrees 
to “the imposition of certain disciplinary sanction.” Consent Orders allow the parties in-
volved to “resolve a disciplinary proceeding initiated by the agency without the time and ex-
pense” of going to court. Id. 
 111 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally 
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 55,719. 
 112 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally 
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 55,718. 
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significant risk that the live feeds of their smart baby monitors would be com-
promised, exposing young children to the chance of being observed and recorded 
by strangers.113 TRENDnet marketed its cameras as secure but they had faulty 
software “that left them open to online viewing, and in some instances listening, 
by anyone with the cameras’ Internet address.”114 
The consent order required TRENDnet to create a better security program and 
apply safeguards to prevent consumers’ privacy from being compromised.115 In 
addition, TRENDnet was ordered to retain third-party service providers outside 
of its company to maintain the security of its smart baby monitors and alert con-
sumers when they have been affected by a breach in security.116  The specificities 
of the consent order fall under nine parts.117 Part I of the consent order prohibits 
TRENDnet from misrepresenting the level of its security measures or the level 
of protection over which the consumer has control.118 
Part II of the consent order establishes eight explicit requirements to create an 
effective security program.119 The eight requirements necessitate the creation of 
a new position to organize and run a security program that identifies risks to 
security and consumer privacy.120 They also require a more secure design process 
and regular testing of the security of their devices.121 The manufacturer must 
adopt any new developments in cybersecurity to ensure the best protection of its 
consumers’ privacy at all times.122 
Part III of the consent order requires TRENDnet to implement a security pro-
gram that meets the requirements of Part II of the consent order, and that the 
security program operates with “sufficient effectiveness.”123 Part III also requires 
TRENDnet to biennially obtain a report from a third-party on the effectiveness 
of its security.124 
                                                 
 113 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally 
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 55,718. 
 114 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74. 
 115 Id.; see generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Pub-
lic Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,718. 
 116 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; see generally 
TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 55,718. 
 117 See TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 55,719. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See id. 
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Part IV of the consent order requires TRENDnet to notify consumers whose 
smart baby monitors security has been breached.125 TRENDnet also must provide 
free instructions to consumers on how to remove the flaw and uninstall or update 
its IP cameras.126 Parts V through IX focus on reporting and compliance provi-
sions that dictate how long TRENDnet is required to follow the provisions.127 
The hope is TRENDnet will maintain the requirements on its own once the re-
quirements have been implemented and followed for 20 years.128 
FTC SUIT AGAINST D-LINK 
On January 5, 2017, the FTC filed suit against D-Link and its United States 
subsidiary in San Francisco’s federal court.129 D-Link is a producer of the Digital 
Baby Monitor Day/Night cloud Camera and Wireless Network Camera, both of 
which are smart baby monitors.130 The complaint states D-Link failed to take 
reasonable steps to secure the routers and Internet protocol cameras that it de-
signed, marketed, and sold, especially in the form of smart baby monitors.131 The 
FTC alleges D-Link’s signing key132 was exposed on a public website, and since 
the default passwords were hardcoded into their machines, its products were eas-
ier to hack.133 Hackers who break into smart baby monitors are able to observe 
families and their homes through the cameras, sometimes speak to vulnerable 
children, and listen to private conversations in the home.134 Some hackers are 
pedophiles who wish to spy on children, and others are criminals who either use 
the device to gather personal information or case the home to rob the family.135 
                                                 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Pagliery, supra note 74; Theodore F. Claypoole & Taylor Ey, FTC Files to Protect 
Consumers’ Security in the Internet of Things, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 21, 2016), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ftc-files-to-protect-consumers-security-internet-things. 
 130 Pagliery, supra note 74. 
 131 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 5, 6, FTC v. D-
Link Corp., N.D. Cal. (filed Jan. 5, 2017) (No. 3:17 Civ. 39), 2017 WL 65168, at ¶¶ 14, 15. 
 132 Signing keys are a technique used for code-signing which “use digital signatures to 
provide identity and integrity for software applications.” Code Signing Best Practices, MI-
CROSOFT 5 (July 25, 2007), https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hard-
ware/dn653556(v=vs.85).aspx; see also Bruce Morton, Code Signing: Best Practices, EN-
TRUST DATACARD: IDENTITY ON BLOG (July 27, 2012), http://www.entrust.com/code-sign-
ing-best-practices/ (describing how to protect private signing keys with code signing). 
 133 Pagliery, supra note 74. 
 134 Cuthbertson, supra note 14; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 4, 2013, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/marketer-internet-connected-home-
security-video-cameras-settles. 
 135 See Cuthbertson, supra note 14 (noting how hacking instances of baby monitors are 
becoming more common and providing advice on how families can protect themselves); 
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The FTC has repeatedly warned D-Link about these “back door” flaws since 
2007 but to no avail.136 D-Link has always stated that it is in compliance with 
COPPA and has not misled its consumers in the level of security its baby moni-
tors contain.137 The FTC has not alleged any breach of product sold by D-Link, 
only that its routers and IP cameras used in smart baby monitors show a pattern 
of poor security practices.138 In the suit against D-Link, the FTC charged D-Link 
with six violations of FTC regulations which specifically enforce COPPA.139 The 
FTC alleges D-Link “failed to take reasonable steps to secure the software for 
their routers and IP cameras” exposing consumers’ local networks and allowing 
unauthorized access to sensitive personal information.140 Additionally, the FTC 
alleges that D-Link misrepresented the quality of the security it was providing 
to customers in all of its products, including its smart baby monitors, and there-
fore constitutes a deceptive act or practice.141 The FTC requested the court 
“[e]nter a permanent injunction to prevent future violations of the FTC Act.”142 
The FTC also asked the court to award the costs of bringing the action to the 
FTC and any additional relief the Court determines to be appropriate.143 
On September 19, 2017, the court issued an Order Re Motion to Dismiss, 
granting in part and denying in part D-Links’ motion to dismiss.144 Counts I, IV, 
and V of the FTC’s complaint were dismissed with leave to amend and the 
agency was given until October 20, 2017 to revise their complaint against D-
Link.145 The judge asserted that the complaint failed to specifically identify an 
incident where a consumer was harmed, and only alleged that the lack of security 
could lead to a breach in consumer’s personal information.146 Additionally, the 
                                                 
Ross, supra note 7. 
 136 Pagliery, supra note 74. 
 137 See Joe Uchill, D-Link fires back on FTC security complaint, THE HILL (Jan. 6, 
2017,12:23 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/313028-d-link-fires-back-on-ftc-
security-complaint (“D-Link Systems maintains a robust range of procedures to address po-
tential security issues, which exist in all Internet of Things (IoT) devices.”). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 131 at 
11-13 (stating the alleged violations of D-Link Corporation). 
 140 Id. at 6,11 (“An attacker could compromise a consumer’s router, thereby obtaining 
unauthorized access to consumers’ sensitive personal information.”). 
 141 Id. at 12 (describing D-Link’s alleged promotional misrepresentations). 
 142 Id. at 13. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Systems, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00039-JD, 2017, WL 
4150873, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017) (order granting dismissal of the unfairness claim, 
deceptive practices claim, and misrepresentation claims against D-Link but denying the mo-
tion to dismiss in all other respects). 
 145 Id. at *6. 
 146 Laura Northrup, Judge Gives D-Link Partial Win In FTC Case Over Vulnerable De-
vices, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 20, 2017, 4:28 PM), https://consumerist.com/2017/09/20/judge-
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judge encouraged the FTC to focus on their deception claims rather than those 
which pose potential harm to American consumers.147  On October 17, 2017 the 
court granted an extension for the FTC to file an amended complaint until Janu-
ary 12, 2018.148 
The case is ongoing and represents the first instance a smart baby monitor 
manufacturer has not settled with the FTC.149 The outcome of this case is critical 
to the future of personal smart products, including smart baby monitors.150 Now 
that this case is in federal court, it should alert Congress to the need to promul-
gate new legislation to improve security for smart baby monitors. 
FTC ATTEMPTS TO RECTIFY SECURITY ISSUES 
Security measures have continued to adapt as technology has evolved.151 
Smart baby monitor manufacturers have the technological capabilities and the 
resources to enhance the security of their products, but because of either negli-
gence or lack of knowledge, do not take advantage of the protections available.152 
To remedy the lack of knowledge, better communication and education of proper 
security measures needs to be available to manufacturers.153 In hopes of remedy-
ing this problem, the FTC issued recommendations and regulations for manu-
facturers of smart baby monitors.154 To comply with the FTC’s recommendations 
                                                 
dismisses-ftc-case-accusing-d-link-of-selling-vulnerable-devices/. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Systems, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00039-JD (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
16, 2017) (order scheduling the deadline to add parties or amend pleadings). 
 149 See Pagliery, supra note 74 (recognizing that usually these types of suits settle). 
 150 See generally id. (commenting on the risk that baby monitors pose is how easily they 
may be hacked); Jared Bomberg, FTC Litigation prompts changes to congressional over-
sight, IAPP (Oct. 27, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/ftc-litigation-prompts-changes-to-con-
gressional-oversight/ (describing Congress’ increased attention to FTC suits at the behest of 
the corporations that the FTC has filed suit against). 
 151 Janet Miller, 7 Ways Technology is Changing Home Security, HUFFINGTON POST: THE 
BLOG (Oct. 19, 2015, 9:21 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janet-miller/7-ways-tech-
nology-is-changing-home-security_b_8324548.html. 
 152 Cuthbertson, supra note 14 (describing the protections available to protect parents 
from baby monitor hacking); see also Flannigan, supra note 7) (discussing the security risks 
around wireless home devices, including baby monitors, and how while the device may 
have some security risks it is also crucial that the owner keep up with updates and determine 
which manufacturers are most compliant with FTC regulations). 
 153 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC REPORT ON INTERNET OF THINGS URGES COMPANIES TO 
ADOPT BEST PRACTICES TO ADDRESS CONSUMER PRIVACY AND SECURITY RISKS (Jan. 27, 
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-
report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf [herein-
after FTC IOT REPORT]. 
 154  Id. 
18 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 26.1 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
and regulations, the manufacturers need to regularly check and monitor the reg-
ulations posted by the FTC.155 They must do so to ensure compliance and demon-
strate they are consistently up to date with the new security and privacy measures 
available to manufacturers of smart baby monitors.156 
The FTC has attempted to remedy the negligence of smart baby monitor man-
ufacturers, but their methods have been ineffective.157 The FTC has had some 
success via the judiciary system.158 One smart baby monitor manufacturing com-
pany, TRENDnet, settled with the FTC and agreed to implement extensive reg-
ulations for its security.159 Another smart baby monitor manufacturer, D-Link, 
refused to settle and is fighting the FTC’s allegations in court.160 The Circuit 
Court’s decision will either apply the broad requirements of COPPA to the nar-
row regulations created by the FTC, or they will recommend to Congress that 
COPPA needs to be amended to include stricter security measures and proce-
dures for smart baby monitors.161 Even if the Court applies the broad terms of 
COPPA and the FTC regulations to force D-Link to apply stricter security 
measures and procedures, Congress should still draft legislation to reflect the 
application of COPPA provided by the court. 
The appropriate remedy to protect the privacy of consumers of smart baby 
monitors is stricter security laws and regulations for the manufacturers of these 
products.162 The FTC has pleaded with Congress to enact legislation based on its 
regulations and recommendations.163 The FTC has stringent regulations that can 
be effectively transformed into legislation, such as establishing and maintaining 
“reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of 
personal information collected from children” and preventing data retention of 
                                                 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See generally id. (discussing that despite the information and technology available to 
smart baby monitor manufacturers, stricter security measures and stronger consumer privacy 
protection has not occurred despite FTC encouragement to adopt better practices). 
 158 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Feb. 7, 2014, supra note 74; TRENDnet, 
Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,717-
18. See generally Claypoole & Ey, supra note 129; Pagliery, supra note 74 (describing what 
the lawsuit sought to enforce). 
 159 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 4, 2013, supra note 15. 
 160 Pagliery, supra note 74 (describing D-Link products and their lack of security). 
 161 See James Cooper, What’s In Store for the FTC’s Privacy & Data Sec. Program in 
2017?, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2017, 10:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesc-
cooper1/2017/03/08/whats-in-store-of-the-ftcs-privacy-data-security-program-in-
2017/#7e22daf41874 (predicting Congress’ reaction to the FTC suit against D’Link and its 
effect on privacy and data security in 2017). 
 162 See id. 
 163 FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 148 (explaining that despite FTC encouragement to 
adopt better practices, stronger consumer privacy protection measures that could institute 
permitted and prohibited uses have not commenced). 
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personal information collected from children.164 Additionally, the conditions out-
lined in settlement of the TRENDnet suit are strong requirements that should be 
adopted by Congress.165 If Congress adopts the requirements expressed in the 
TRENDnet consent order, the security of smart baby monitors will increase dra-
matically.166 This will provide more safety for consumers of smart baby monitors 
when using the products. 
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO SECURE SMART BABY MONITORS 
Some manufacturers of smart baby monitors have adopted their own regula-
tions based on the TRENDnet suit.167 Two smart baby monitor manufacturers 
that have embraced self-regulation and increased security measures are Mattel 
and Amazon.168 These manufacturers can serve as examples to Congress and 
other smart baby monitor manufacturers of the ways they can follow best prac-
tices of the protection of consumer privacy.169 For those smart baby manufactur-
ers that do not self-regulate their security measures, federal legislation must be 
imposed. 
There are a few key points from the TRENDnet suit that can be proposed as 
legislation to increase security and the protection of consumers’ privacy. Sug-
gested legislation would require 1) stricter login credentials; 2) a department to 
monitor the security of a product and the potential breaches of privacy; 3) train-
ing and continuing education for individuals in charge of monitoring the security 
of products; and 4) the manufacturer to notify consumers if their privacy has 
been breached and provide free services to remedy the breaches. 170 These four 
proposed security measures for smart baby monitor manufacturers are further 
discussed below. 
A. Stricter Login Credentials and Updates to Programs 
                                                 
 164 15 U.S.C. §6502(b)(1)(D) (2012); see generally Cooper, supra note 156 (stating that 
the Federal Trade Commission regulations have effectively acted like federal statutes and 
have removed the harm requirement of the regulations). 
 165 See generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public 
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,719. 
 166 See generally id. 
 167 See Mark Wilson, Mattel is Building an Alexa For Kids, FAST CO.: CO. DESIGN (Jan. 
3, 2017), https://www.fastcodesign.com/3066881/mattel-is-building-an-alexa-for-kids (de-
scribing their new product Aristotle and their focus on COPPA compliance and protecting 
children’s personal information). 
 168 See id. 
 169 See id. 
 170 See generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public 
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,719. 
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First, stricter login credentials for smart baby monitors can be easily achieved 
and protected. Consumers usually leave login credentials for their smart baby 
monitors at factory settings because consumers are unaware of the risks they 
face.171 Factory login credentials are historically easy to hack.172 The average 
consumer does not understand the risks to their privacy or even how to change 
their login credentials on their smart baby monitors.173 Some smart baby moni-
tors do not even allow the factory set passwords to be changed.174 The login keys 
are not protected by the manufacturers and are even publicly transmitted over 
the Internet.175 The easiest remedy to mitigate this risk is to require smart baby 
monitor manufacturers to have stricter login credentials.176 For those devices that 
have fixed login keys, creating login keys that can be changed by the consumers 
allows for an extra level of protection aside from the protections that should be 
built into the smart baby monitors.177 
Second, there needs to be advanced encryption of login keys.178 There are 
methods for transmitting login keys safely over the Internet that are available to 
manufacturers, but manufacturers do not use these methods.179 The lax security 
of login credentials is not due to unavailability of appropriate technology, but to 
the negligence of the manufacturing companies.180  The best practices for code 
                                                 
 171 See generally Jehl et al., supra note 25. 
 172 See generally id. 
 173 See generally id. 
 174 See id. 
 175 Cuthbertson, supra note 14 (explaining that manufacturers publicly transmit data over 
the Internet for parents to view live feeds, many of which are not protected); Press Release, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Sept. 4, 2013, supra note 15. 
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Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 4, 2013, supra note 15. 
 177 Cuthbertson, supra note 14. 
 178 See generally Shivali Best, Are Hackers Watching You and Your Children? Yet An-
other Flaw in Samsung’s Security SmartCam Could Let Criminals Spy on Your Home, 
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cess a parent’s network, turn the camera on, and potentially lock their account without ad-
vanced encryption of login keys); TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to 
Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,719. 
 179 Best, supra note 173 (exemplifying Samsung as a manufacturer that has chosen not to 
utilize available methods for safely transmitting login credentials, and instead chose to re-
move the web interface feature altogether); see generally TRENDnet, Inc.; Analysis of Pro-
posed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,718. 
 180 Best, supra note 178 (exemplifying Samsung has a manufacturer that has chosen not 
to utilize available methods for safely transmitting login credentials, and instead chose to re-
move the web interface feature altogether). 
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signing,181 or encryption of login keys, are (1) to minimize unauthorized access 
to private keys; (2) to protect private keys with cryptographic hardware;182 (3) to 
time stamp the code for easy verification; (4) to use test-signing;183 (5) to authen-
ticate all and any codes; (6) to scan for viruses before signing keys; and (7) to 
change the use of keys and certificates often and revoke signing keys when a 
security flaw is discovered.184 Instead of relying on the inexperience of consum-
ers, manufacturers should be required to protect the transmittance of login cre-
dentials so the easily hacked network keys are no longer an issue.185 Security 
login credentials are not the only problem smart baby monitor manufacturers 
need to remedy. 
In addition to a lack of secure login credentials, manufacturers leave holes for 
hackers to enter products around the updates they send to consumers.186 Often 
the php files,187 which provide updates to baby monitor cameras, are not properly 
secured.188 The scripts often have bugs that allow non-admin users to gain remote 
access to the smart devices.189 The updates consumers receive are to improve the 
functions of the application used to control the smart baby monitors.190 Smart 
baby monitor manufacturers are constantly updating the applications to prevent 
bugs in the programming.191 When manufacturers provide updates to consumers 
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2017), http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=70590. 
 183 Id. (quoting Test-signing certificates “[help] ensure [the] test certificates are trusted 
only within the intended environment.”). 
 184 Id. 
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 190 See Lisa Vaas, How to Secure Your Baby Monitor, SOPHOS LTD. (Apr. 24, 2015), 
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/04/24/how-to-secure-your-baby-monitor/ (explain-
ing how to access software updates for smart baby monitors in order to enhance security). 
 191 See Taylor Martin, How to Prevent your Security Camera from Being Hacked, CNET 
(Aug. 22, 2016),  https://www.cnet.com/how-to/how-to-prevent-your-security-camera-from-
being-hacked/ (acknowledging parents can and should update the monitor firmware fre-
quently, whenever possible). 
22 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 26.1 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
to improve the security of their smart devices, the manufacturers need to ensure 
that the update is sent safely to consumers. 
B. Security Monitoring Department 
Manufacturers, especially large manufacturers, have difficulty securing their 
smart devices.192 Another simple way for large manufacturers to prevent the in-
vasion of consumer privacy and violation of their security is to require the man-
ufacturers of smart baby monitors to create a department to monitor the security 
of their products.193 Third parties will often test the security of smart baby mon-
itor products and their networks to determine their ability to be hacked.194 Third 
parties will then notify the manufacturers of the flaws, but manufactures often 
do not respond to the notifications.195 The holes in the smart baby monitor prod-
ucts and networks are easily penetrated and never repaired by the manufactur-
ers.196 
If the manufacturers establish a department dedicated to probing for holes and 
remedying any breaches they discover, the smart baby monitor products and net-
works could be constantly updated to prevent any new threat.197 These depart-
ments will ensure the security of their smart baby monitor products and networks 
is repeatedly reinforced and can assure the continued protection of consumer 
privacy.198 Many companies have not created a security-monitoring department 
due to an apathy towards security and improper budgeting.199 Smart personal 
product companies such as Mattel and Microsoft prioritize the security of their 
consumers’ personal information.200 By prioritizing security, they have ensured 
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their security monitoring departments receive the proper training and funding 
they need to be effective.201 Other manufacturers of smart baby monitors have 
no excuse for not establishing an effective security-monitoring department.202 
Even if manufacturers claim they cannot afford to establish a new in-house se-
curity monitoring department due to the expense, they already possess the req-
uisite resources to do so.203 
If the manufacturer cannot establish an in-house security monitoring depart-
ment, then it should be required to engage a third party security monitoring com-
pany.204 When there is a risk for a breach of customers’ privacy, these third party 
security monitoring companies can either enhance the security measures of the 
manufacturers’ smart devices or issue a report to manufacturers informing them 
of the necessary changes to their smart devices they must take to remedy poten-
tial breaches in consumer privacy.205 Third parties often supply manufacturers 
with reports warning the manufacturers of potential risks, but they are frequently 
ignored.206 By forcing manufacturers to employ their own department or third 
party security monitoring company, they will have the advice of the reports pro-
vided to them. 
There should also be an additional requirement obligating manufacturers of 
smart baby monitors to apply the advice and findings of the reports.207 Simply 
obtaining the reports does not ensure the manufacturing companies will apply 
the findings of the reports.208 These reports, whether obtained in house or through 
third-parties, provides valuable insight to any gaps or holes in their smart baby 
monitors’ security.209 This allows smart baby monitor manufacturers to remedy 
the breaches in security that could occur. 
C. Training and Education 
Some manufacturers have existing departments for monitoring security that 
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are not properly trained or updated on changes in the security field.210 As the 
ability of Internet hackers to break through security defenses increases daily, 
manufacturers must ensure their security-monitoring department is constantly 
evolving to best keep out Internet hackers.211 The security monitoring depart-
ments are the first and last lines of defense for the protection of consumer pri-
vacy.212 By providing training and education for their security monitoring de-
partments, manufacturers can provide the best service available to protect their 
customers.213 
D. Consumer Notification and Remedies 
As discussed above, there have been attempts by some state and federal leg-
islatures to provide adequate notification to consumers but it has not been 
enough.214 Some of the proposed legislation has not passed and some has 
passed.215 To make consumers aware of the dangers and liability they face in 
purchasing smart baby monitors, manufacturers should be required to provide 
more than a mere warning label on the box. While a warning label on the smart 
baby monitor boxes is helpful, manufacturers should be required to make the 
warning labels easily readable. The law should require manufacturers to provide 
information in a manual on how consumers can best protect themselves from 
harm and a violation of their privacy.216 The manufacturer should include the 
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manual in the box with any installation and use instructions.217 While manufac-
turers cannot guarantee consumers will read this information, it is still important 
to provide the warnings.218 Other methods such as promotional campaigns on 
television or the Internet can spread awareness to consumers of the dangers and 
steps they can take to ensure their privacy is protected.219 
When the warnings, security monitoring departments, stricter login creden-
tials and software updating procedures fail, manufacturers should have a plan to 
remedy the security breach.220 The law should require manufacturers to notify 
consumers of the breach in security and the potential invasion of their privacy.221 
Then, the law should also require manufactures to fix the bugs and create a patch 
for the smart baby monitors to prevent future breaches from occurring.222 Man-
ufacturers should provide support for consumers whose privacy has been com-
promised to recommend steps consumers could take to rectify the violation and 
provide recommendations on how to help prevent future breaches from occur-
ring.223 
Smart baby monitor manufacturers should be held accountable for their ac-
tions and be required to do more than alert consumers to the security breach, and 
the potential exposure of consumers’ private and personal information.224 By 
compelling smart baby monitor manufacturers to patch the breach, future secu-
rity breaches of consumer personal information would decrease significantly.225 
Additionally, spending the money and resources to help consumers contain the 
damage they have suffered by the exposure of their personal information will 
encourage smart baby monitor manufacturers to improve their security.226 The 
expense they will incur is all the motivation smart baby monitor manufacturers 
need to strengthen security. Some smart baby monitor manufacturers are taking 
note of the FTC suits and are motivated to improve their security.227 
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E. Aristotle 
One manufacturer of baby monitors recognized the need for stricter security 
regulations to protect the privacy of families and children.228 Mattel and Mi-
crosoft partnered to create Aristotle, a smart baby monitor branded as a “tabletop 
digital nanny.”229 Aristotle is “a voice-activated smart assistant.”230 It answers 
questions for the parents and children, orders baby supplies when they get low, 
sings babies to sleep, and plays games with the children.231 Aristotle is controlled 
through an application on consumers’ cellular phones.232 Aristotle uses a voice-
activated speaker, streams encrypted video to the consumers’ smart phone, and 
uses special software designed to increase the security of the smart baby monitor 
and protect consumer privacy.233 
Executives from Mattel and Microsoft assert that the companies built Aristo-
tle in accordance with COPPA compliance to ensure children’s privacy is main-
tained.234 Additionally, there are no default passwords. Without default pass-
words, the smart baby monitor is less exposed to hackers.235 Mattel and Microsoft 
designed the technology so that “the phone and Aristotle forget their own en-
crypted connection via Bluetooth... [and] [a]ll data is always encrypted to and 
from devices and to and from the cloud.”236 Mattel and Microsoft were not com-
pelled by the FTC to incorporate these security measures into their new device 
they chose to regulate themselves.237 Congress can use the success of Mattel and 
Microsoft’s Aristotle to promulgate legislation for other smart baby monitor 
manufacturers with which to comply. Other smart baby monitor manufacturers 
should look to Mattel and Microsoft’s example if they wish to prevent future 
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litigation and security breaches of their consumers’ privacy. 
Despite the enhanced regulations Mattel and Microsoft have applied to Aris-
totle, the smart baby monitor will not be impervious to hackers, but it will be 
significantly safer.238 Mattel and Microsoft should still ensure they have an easily 
readable warning label, an effective security-monitoring department, increased 
education and training for the security-monitoring department, and established 
remedies for the consumers when their privacy is compromised.239   
Aristotle is the start to a safer smart baby monitor, but more can always be 
done to ensure stronger security. Congress cannot rely on all smart baby monitor 
manufacturers like Mattel and Microsoft to adopt effective security measures on 
their own. Congress must promulgate laws to force the compliance of other 
smart baby monitor manufacturers and to enhance the security measures some 
smart baby monitor manufacturers are already taking.   
CONCLUSION 
The FTC suit against D-Link and the progressive actions of Mattel and Mi-
crosoft are only the beginning of increased security measures in smart baby mon-
itors.240 Hopefully, other smart baby monitor manufacturers will realize the im-
portance of protecting the privacy of their consumers and the consumers’ chil-
dren. Once other manufacturers of smart baby monitors detect the changes oc-
curring in the industry, they will begin their own processes to increase the secu-
rity of their smart devices. 
Congress cannot rely on manufacturers of smart baby monitors to take on this 
daunting task of implementing stricter security measures on their own. Congress 
must promulgate new legislation specifically to protect the privacy of children 
involving smart baby monitors. Whether COPPA is to be modernized, a new 
federal law is established, or there is multiple new state laws regulating smart 
baby monitors and the manufacturers individually, something needs to change. 
Regulating the security of baby-monitors is important to the privacy and 
safety of children, and new legislation should be adopted to enforce security. 
Few smart baby monitor-manufacturing companies are motivated to improve 
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security to protect consumers’ privacy and personal information. The FTC suits 
and regulations are not strict enough to force compliance of an entire industry. 
Hackers are becoming more sophisticated every day, making smart baby moni-
tors vulnerable to those who wish to invade the privacy of families and young 
children. 
 
